Foucault, Michel. (1995). Discipline & Punish: The birth of the prison. [Trans. A. Sheridan, 1977.]. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
pp. 195-228, 3. Panopticism (continued)
Within the panopticon the person in the central watch tower can see every cell. This meant that it was possible “to avoid those compact, swarming, howling masses” (p. 200) found in confinement. The watcher can see but the one watched cannot. The individual is “the object of information, never a subject in communication” (p. 200). Applied to schoolchildren, there would be “no copying, no noise, no chatter, no wasting of time” speculates Foucault (p. 201). The individual is visible (s/he can see the watch tower) but unverifiable (s/he cannot tell if anyone is watching). This architecture of individuality could be applied to prisons, to schools, and to workplaces. The panopticon had several functions. Foucault says “it automatizes and disindividualizes power” (p. 202) meaning that anyone, no matter their rank, can stand in the watch tower; but someone must at all times. Another function is as a laboratory of power. Conditions could be changed for some individuals and not for others. Over time the consequences of changing conditions could be noticed. Foucault summarizes these functions.
It is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons. (p. 205)
The power relations are embedded in the structure itself rather than added on from outside. The structure produces the functions. Function follows form. Discipline moves from external application through confinement, arresting, punishing to generalized surveillance. This movement was part of larger processes.
1. The functional inversion of the disciplines (p. 210). “The disciplines function increasingly as techniques for making useful individuals” (p. 211).
2. The swarming of disciplinary mechanisms (p. 211). The disciplines were broken down into “flexible methods of control” (p. 211).
Thus the Christian School must not simply train docile children; it must also make it possible to supervise their parents, to gain information as to their way of life, their resources, their piety, their morals. (p. 211)
Disciplinary procedures were spread through smaller institutions such as religious groups or charity organizations. You could say that neighbors spied on each other in the name of God and goodness.
3. The state-control of the mechanisms of discipline (p. 213). Private religious groups gave way to a centralized police (pp. 213-215). The spectacle had given way to surveillance.
The importance, in historical mythology, of the Napoleonic character probably derives from the fact that it is at the point of junction of the monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignty and the hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite discipline. (p. 217)
Foucault offers three broad historical processes to which the formation of the disciplinary society is connected:
1. economic: (a) to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost; (b) to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible; and (c) to link this growth with the output of the apparatuses, thereby increasing the docility and the utility of all of the elements of the system (p. 218).
2. juridico-political: (a) the formation of a parliamentary, representative regime; (b) establishment of an egalitarian juridical framework; and (c) bourgeoisie become the political dominant class in the eighteenth century (p. 222).
Moreover, whereas the juridical systems define juridical subjects according to universal norms, the disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate. (p. 223)
The prison is the place where “the codified power to punish turns into a disciplinary power to observe” (p. 224).
3. scientific: (a) the hospital, the school, and the workshop become “apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could be used in them as an instrument of subjection; and (b) which led to the formation of “clinical medicine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology, and rationalization of labour” (p. 224).
The eighteenth century invented the techniques of discipline and the examination, rather as the Middle Ages invented the judicial investigation….The investigation procedure, an old fiscal and administrative technique, had developed above all with the reorganization of the Church and the increase of the princely states of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (p. 225)
The investigation was “an authoritarian search for a truth” and “the sovereign power arrogating to itself the right to establish the truth” (p. 225).
In fact, the investigation has been the no doubt crude, but fundamental element in the constitution of the empirical sciences; it has been the juridico-political matrix of this experimental knowledge, which, as we know, was very rapidly released at the end of the Middle Ages. (p. 225)
Foucault points out that “in Greece, mathematics were born from techniques of measurement” while “the sciences of nature, … were born … at the end of the Middle Ages, from the practices of investigation” (p. 226). The investigation describes, establishes “facts,” creates a written record, describes a methodology, and reinforces the examination. Foucault summarizes this chapter in the following two questions:
Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penality? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons? (p. 228)